Abstract:

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Color objectivism is the view that colors are mind-independent properties of objects, while non-objectivist views—such as color relationalism and subjectivism—maintain that colors are mind-dependent. Non-objectivists often cite perceptual variation—differences in color experience across species, individuals, and contexts—as a reason for rejecting color objectivism. In contrast, objectivists point to perceptual agreement—the tendency of perceivers to report similar color experiences or judgments when viewing the same targets—as evidence for the mind-independence of color.

 

Recently, Shech and Watkins (2023) have advanced a new argument from perceptual agreement against non-objectivism, presenting a case where two perceivers observe two walls under various illumination conditions and agree that the walls have the same color. They contend that non-objectivist theories lack a satisfactory explanation for this agreement, whereas objectivism offers a straightforward one: the agreement arises because the walls share a common mind-independent property—determinate color.

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I argue that non-objectivists can offer a plausible alternative explanation, grounded not in metaphysical theory, but in an account of the functions of color vision. One plausible function is to highlight surface similarities for the purposes of object identification, re-identification, and comparison, which can account for perceptual agreement in everyday contexts, including Shech and Watkins’ example. Another plausible function is to enhance chromatic contrast between surfaces to facilitate scene segmentation, explaining some types of perceptual variation.